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i.

Introduction

The Breakthrough,1 as the title suggests, is
a kind of sequel to the provocative work
of human rights history’s current enfant
terrible, Samuel Moyn. He co-edits this
volume of contributed works with a kindred colleague, Jan Eckel, who teaches
modern and contemporary history at the
University of Freiburg, Germany. In an
early footnote, Moyn recognizes the similarity of the project he and Eckel share:
“[Eckel and I] propose somewhat different
interpretations of why the decade [of the
1970s] was so pivotal.”2 Moyn, until this
year a professor of history at Columbia
University, and who is also trained in law,
will join the faculty of his alma mater,
Harvard Law School, in the fall of 2014
as a professor of law. Provocation can,
in some circumstances, lead to academic
ascendency. Moyn’s earlier work, The Last
Utopia: Human Rights in History (2010),
has become something of a bellwether
in the field, the volume that must be
responded to, whether by friend or foe,
and the yardstick by which support for
a certain view of human rights history,
		1.
		2.

indeed of human rights themselves, must
be engaged. The Breakthrough, in many
ways, continues the same line of critique;
in others, it challenges the revisionist
project.
At face value, The Breakthrough is a
fascinating collection of essays, all by
historians rather than lawyers (other than
Moyn), and all with what is said to be
a shared thesis that something special
happened in the field of human rights
in the 1970s, something transformative
and definitional for the global movement
(hence the title). The contributions are
framed by an opening descriptive essay
by Moyn and a grand synthesis chapter
at the conclusion by Eckel. The Eckel
chapter, well written and clear, is a place
for the casual reader to get a sense of the
overall project of the book.
In his introduction in this volume,
Moyn restates the thesis of The Last
Utopia in a passage that bears extended
quotation:
In particular, historians have begun to
focus on the era of the 1970s, when—
initial indications suggested—the idea
of international human rights achieved a
prominence that far outstripped even that
of its founding epoch thirty years before.
Amnesty International, the first human
rights non-governmental organization of
note, achieved striking visibility, especially
through its Campaign Against Torture [and
won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977]. Soviet
dissidents rallied around human rights,
attracting a massive global audience for
their heroism in facing down a totalitarian
state. After coups in the Southern Cone of

The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s (Jan Eckel & Samuel Moyn eds., 2014)
[hereinafter The Breakthrough].
Samuel Moyn, The Return of the Prodigal: The 1970s as a Turning Point in Human Rights
History, in The Breakthrough, supra note 1, at 1, 261 n.5.
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the Americas beginning in the summer of
1973, appeals to human rights became
a slogan of local response and international solidarity. The Helsinki Accords
were signed in 1975, incorporating what
became a fateful “third basket” of human
rights principles. And President Jimmy
Carter, beginning in January 1977, gave
the United States a “human rights policy.”
Contemporaries registered these separate
but converging events as an explosion.3

This, then, is both the central thesis
of Moyn’s revisionist work itself, and is
more fully explored in this collection of
essays authored by a distinctly Western
group of historians, an eclectic set of
readings bringing in perspectives from
around the globe on human rights developments during the 1970s. In fact,
the makeup of the contributors to this
volume is one of several issues that drew
my attention for this review. In addition
to a short sketch on the contributors and
their contributions, this essay will also
explore four central questions: first, what
is the “Moynian project,” the animus
of this historian—cum—law professor;
second, what are the 1970s, at least as
they are defined here; third, what are the
human rights about which this history
is written, in both theory and practice;
and fourth, what is the broader context
of human rights histories within which
this work is set?
Before setting off on those questions,
let’s take a look at the contributors and
their contributions, save Moyn himself,
whom I will discuss more below. In
looking over the contents of the book,
one is struck by the organization of the
topics. First and last, as mentioned above,
		3.
		4.
		 5.
		6.
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are the framing essays by the two editors. Eckel, perhaps lesser known than
Moyn to US audiences, shares Moyn’s
focus on the 1970s as a pivotal fulcrum
in human rights history. He says, at the
beginning of his summative chapter,
that “[he] will argue that the 1970s did
mark a new moment in human rights
history. Nonetheless, this new moment
should not be viewed as homogeneous
and clear-cut but as an intricate and
manifold shift.”4 Moyn himself professes
here to be cautious in his assessment
of the central thesis, suggesting that
“[n]othing is settled in the chronological shift forward,” and that the first goal
of this work is “to pool the results of
researchers focusing on disparate areas
of the globe and to pose basic questions
about advancing the clock of scholarship.” He concludes that the work “illustrates the need for further research,
as well as the reconceptualization that
always goes along with it.” He notes
the “paradox” that “[t]he general history
of the 1970s” is one associated with
“disaster or even ‘nervous breakdown,’”
not with “the moral breakthrough of human rights.”5
The geography of the volume is wide.
It begins with the breakaway efforts of
the short-lived counterinsurgency of
“the Biafran War of Secession” in Nigeria during the early 1970s.6 It moves
through the former Soviet Union (three
chapters), and on to Latin America (two
chapters) and the United States (two
chapters), followed by essays on Poland,
Indonesia, and South Africa, although the
focus of the South African chapter, rather

Id. at 2 (footnotes omitted).
Jan Eckel, The Rebirth of Politics from the Spirit of Morality: Explaining the Human
Rights Revolution of the 1970s, in The Breakthrough, supra note 1, at 226, 227.
All quotes Moyn, The Return of the Prodigal, supra note 2, at 2–3 (footnotes omitted).
Lasse Heerten, The Dystopia of Postcolonial Catastrophe: Self-Determination, the Biafran
War of Secession, and the 1970s Human Rights Moment, in The Breakthrough, supra
note 1, at 15, 15.
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disappointingly in my view, was not on
that country’s struggle to end apartheid
but on British anti-apartheid activism,
again shifting the focus west and north.
Although the chapter on Poland seems
to focus somewhat on the Helsinki process, it seemed out of place for me, and
would have been more appropriately
placed with the chapters on the former
Soviet Union (Russia, East Germany, and
East Berlin). In fact, I found the Polish
chapter to be the weakest in the volume,
misplaced both in terms of location and
content, the latter of which focused on
Polish politics to the virtual exclusion of
human rights, despite the supposed anchor of the Helsinki accords.7 By contrast,
I found the chapters on Latin America
(the area of focus of a good deal of my
own work) and the United States to be
particularly strong and informative. The
chapters on Biafra and Indonesia also
were excellent and informative in their
content, although the former may not fit
well within the 1970s time frame, as I
discuss below. Earlier I have noted that
chapter authors were either from the
United States or Western Europe; they are
also largely young and male. Seven of the
thirteen authors are doctoral candidates
or lecturers, and only two are women.
Whether they are acolytes of the Moyn/
Eckel school remains to be seen.

ii.	The Moynian Project
Moyn describes the thesis of his earlier
and still-controversial book The Last Uto		7.
		8.
		9.
10.
11.
12.

917

pia in a later work as follows: “people
too often present human rights, which
make up merely a recent and temporary
version of idealism, as if they were the
exclusive and necessary inheritance from
idealism’s history.”8 If that articulation
were not controversial enough, he adds
a later, perhaps subtextual thesis in the
same article: “I am so underwhelmed
by what human rights have done for the
world so far that I ask whether it is time
to consider other things (new utopias,
precisely) in theory and practice.”9 To
the idealistic historians of human rights,
who can trace their etymology to biblical
sources and beyond, these are fighting
words. Now there is a new elephant in
the room, and human rights histories
must, it seems, of necessity engage the
revisionist views of what might be called
the Moynian project, or some other adulatory term of choice. That debate, and
Moyn’s influence, is exemplified in a
recent exchange between Philip Alston10
and Jenny Martinez, regarding her own
book on what she calls “the Origins of
International Human Rights Law” in the
slave trade.11 Their exchange, published
in the Harvard Law Review and its
Forum, spills a good deal of ink not so
much engaging each other’s views, but
in the explanation, defense, or refutation
of Moyn and his last utopian thesis. In
a later article by Moyn, previously cited
here, he takes on critiques of his work
by “three preeminent scholars” as part
of the program of a 2011 meeting of the
American Political Science Association.12
He was, at least in 2011, the figure of

Gunter Dehnert, The Polish Opposition, the Crisis of the Gierek Era, and the Helsinki
Process, in The Breakthrough, supra note 1, at 166.
Samuel Moyn, The Continuing Perplexities of Human Rights, 22 Qui Parle 95, 100
(2013).
Id. at 105.
Philip Alston, Does the Past Matter? On the Origins of Human Rights, 126 Harv. L. Rev.
2043, 2066–80 passim (2013) (reviewing Jenny S. Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins
of International Human Rights Law (2012)).
Jenny S. Martinez, Human Rights and History, 126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 221, 232–40 (2013).
Moyn, The Continuing Perplexities of Human Rights, supra note 8, at 100.
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stature to be reckoned with—at the very
least for his Warholian fifteen minutes.
Some clues to the roots of the Moynian project can be found in Moyn’s own
opening chapter in this volume, where he
cites Michel Foucault, post-modernism’s
rebel supreme, for the proposition that
“[w]here antiquarian history accumulates
facts, and monumental history deploys
them for the purposes of self-aggrandizing
edification, critical history uses knowledge of the past to go on the attack.”13
And go on the attack he does. Eckel,
too, invokes an image of the 1970s for
historians as a time approached “from the
angle of what was lost,” as the decade
that “constitutes the ‘post-’ age—postindustrial, postmodern, poststructuralist—
and human rights certainly formed [a]
. . . part of it.”14
One is struck by Moyn’s invocation of
New Testament biblical metaphors in his
work. His opening chapter here is called
“The Return of the Prodigal,” and invokes
Luke 15:11–32, for the proposition that
“[i]t was as if the history of human rights
were the parable of the prodigal son . .
. but only narrated his birth and departure—even though it is his return that really mattered.”15 In another article on his
writing, he is bolder, invoking the Jesus
story as metaphor for his own writings:
It seems obvious—it goes without saying—that without Jesus Christ there would
have been no church, and with no church
there would have been no Reformation,
and so on and so forth. Self-evidently, in
fact, some continuity back to the beginning of time is required for any later event
to occur.16
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
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However, he continues,
Christians to this day appeal to Jesus or
the “primitive Christianity” that followed
his coming for guidance when they worry
that history since has parted ways with the
miraculous origin. . . . [I]t is not as if one
needs to return to Jesus to find alternatives
to the current form of the church.17

In his own historiography on human
rights, a masterful work in itself, he once
again invokes the Jesus metaphor:
Much as Christianity was once attributed
to Jesus rather than to the long-developing
stages and politics of the institutionalization of his memory and teachings, the
historiography of the 1940s teaches much
about the substance of the Universal Declaration but nothing about why almost no
one noticed it when it appeared (or if they
learned of it, rejected its good news, much
like Jesus’s own contemporaries).18

One reads a whiff of the messianic in the
Moynian project. Without Moyn, might
there be no history of human rights?
The Moynian project, carried on in
his provocative and regular writing of
reviews and observations for The Nation
magazine, seems impossible to ignore,
whether by historians or lawyers. His
views may be misguided or mistaken,
but it seems they must be engaged, and
the largely doting acolytes of this volume
sit at the feet of a prodigious intellect, by
any measure, one who has shifted the
discourse on human rights, for good or
ill. To quote another of his reviewers, a
historian who calls his Last Utopia “daring and original”: “Moyn’s is a brilliant
analysis, full of incisive and insightful

Moyn, The Return of the Prodigal, supra note 2, at 14, 263 n.24.
Eckel, supra note 4, at 259.
Moyn, The Return of the Prodigal, supra note 2, at 1.
Moyn, The Continuing Perplexities of Human Rights, supra note 8, at 95–96.
Id.
Samuel Moyn, Substance, Scale, and Salience: The Recent Historiography of Human
Rights, 8 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 123, 128 (2012).
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accounts of an astonishing array of
thinkers and movements.”19 Polymath or
smarty-pants; only time will tell.

iii. What Are “the 1970s,”
and What Did and
Didn’t Happen to Human
Rights Then?
This section will explore some aspects
of the time frame in which Moyn’s own
work, and that of The Breakthrough, took
place: the 1970s. I am not a historian. I
am a lawyer and law professor, approaching human rights as a matter of legal
doctrine; I read histories of human rights
for personal interest, but also for professional use. While most of my students
are most interested in knowing how to
effectively enforce human rights through
law, they are also eager to know when,
where, and how human rights come
about. Like Antony Anghie, who has engaged with Moyn’s work in a thoughtful
and reflective way, I write here from that
lawyer’s perspective, driven, like Anghie,
by “doctrinal developments, the changes
in legal principles and structures that led
to such a dramatic expansion in the reach
of international law, and the transformation in the relationship between the state
and the individual that resulted.”20

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

24.
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I must rely on the characterizations by
historians in framing human rights in the
1970s—indeed the 1970s themselves—
from a historical perspective. Carl J. Bon
Tempo, a historian, notes in his chapter
in The Breakthrough that “[h]istorians of
the United States recently have turned
their attention to the 1970s. In the words
of one chronicler, ‘something happened’
during this decade that shaped the United
States for the rest of the twentieth century.”21 Other historians seem to confirm
this recent fascination with that particular
decade as a focal period for change.22
That focus has led other historians to
signal, in the same year that Moyn’s Last
Utopia was published, that the 1970s
were a signal time and fulcrum period for
human rights, on much the same basis as
he.23 That knowledge, I believe, is helpful
in situating this work on human rights
during the 1970s within the broader field
of historical study.
Yet another aspect of the 1970s more
broadly is the tendency of historians to
treat particular historical periods using
“long” or “short” time framing. Moyn
himself notes this phenomenon and cites
to other works that suggest that the 1970s
may be one of those “long” decades.24
He cites to the work of Bruce Schulman,
who has defined the “long 1970s” as “the
period between Richard Nixon’s entrance

Devin O. Pendas, Toward a New Politics? On the Recent Historiography of Human
Rights, 21 Contemp. Eur. Hist. 95, 104 (2012).
Antony Anghie, Whose Utopia? Human Rights, Development, and the Third World, 22
Qui Parle 63, 65–66 (2013).
Carl J. Bon Tempo, Human Rights and the U.S. Republican Party in the Late 1970s, in
The Breakthrough, supra note 1, at 146 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective (Niall Ferguson et al. eds.,
2011) [hereinafter The Shock of the Global].
Michael Cotey Morgan, The Seventies and the Rebirth of Human Rights, in The Shock
of the Global, supra note 22, at 237, 240 (during the 1970s, human rights became “a
new window of opportunity,” and “human rights [became] the common international
language of the good.”).
Moyn, The Return of the Prodigal, supra note 2, at 3.
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in the White House in 1969 and Ronald
Reagan’s landslide reelection in 1984.”25
Thus, although “[e]ven a generous
definition of the 1970s has to begin and
end somewhere,”26 the “1970s” may, from
a historical point of view, encompass
a good chunk of other decades, both
before and after. This is not the kind of
precision to which most legal scholars
are accustomed, but it does seem that a
good number of the chapters in this book
seem to elide the 1970s into other decades, most often in an earlier direction,
sometime around 1968, a banner year for
all things revolutionary and disruptive,
particularly for students and activists (of
which I was both).
This ambiguity as to the 1970s time
frame is best exemplified, in my view, by
two of the chapters in The Breakthrough.
The Biafra chapter notes in the opening
line that the Nigerian Civil War, an effort to create the secessionist Republic
of Biafra, took place between 1967 and
1970;27 to be precise, the secessionists
surrendered only fifteen days into the
decade, on 15 January 1970.28 Whatever
the chapter may teach about media representations of “starving Biafran babies”
and the impression of impeding genocide
in some quarters, does it teach anything
about the explosion of human rights in
the 1970s? The Biafran revolution was
over before the 1970s began. The author
25.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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tries to wring some 1970s juice from the
experience by citing Walter Schwarz’s
observation that the “ghost” of Biafra
informed later movements, particularly
the founding of Mèdecins sans Frontières,
or Doctors Without Borders, in the next
decade,29 but the link feels all too weak
to merit treatment as consistent with the
Moyn thesis.
The other troubling chapter, in both
time framing and subject matter, was
one that invoked the trope of the long
1970s in its title.30 In that chapter, Simon
Stevens cites to Schulman again, framing
“the long 1970s” as “the period from
1969 to 1984.”31 He then purports to
“bracket” the long 1970s for his chapter’s
purposes with the actions of two antiapartheid groups in Britain: the Stop the
Seventy Tour in 1969 to 1970 and the
City of London’s Anti-Apartheid Group
in 1982.32 Aside from the troubling fact
that these two events mostly do not take
place in the 1970s (the Stop the Seventy
Tour was successful by May of 1970, five
months into the decade,)33 the chapter
itself does little to convince this reader
that human rights—whether in discourse
or action—had much to do with these
largely political movements, or that the
1970s was a fulcrum period for their
activities. The chapter meanders from the
late 1950s well into the 1990s, including
a chart showing membership in British

Dolph Briscoe IV, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and
Politics by Bruce J. Schulman (2001), not even past (Mar. 7, 2012), https://notevenpast.
org/seventies-great-shift-american-culture-society-and-politics-2001/ (reviewing Bruce J.
Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (2001)).
Moyn, The Return of the Prodigal, supra note 2, at 3.
Heerten, supra note 6, at 15.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 30, 268 n.86, quoting Walter Schwarz, Biafra’s Embarrassing Ghost Lingers On,
Guardian, 28 Jan. 1970.
Simon Stevens, Why South Africa? The Politics of Anti-Apartheid Activism in Britain in
the Long 1970s, in The Breakthrough, supra note 1, at 204.
Id. at 205, 317 n.4
Id. at 205.
Id. at 210.
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anti-apartheid organizations covering the
period from 1963 to 1993 and showing a
significant rise in membership during the
late 1980s.34 Where are the 1970s here?
The absence of human rights discussion
in the chapter is best demonstrated in
the two conclusions reached by the
author about the “origins and nature” of
the two anti-apartheid campaigns studied. First, they sought to “transform the
political and economic order not only
in South Africa but also in Britain”; and
second, South African exiles were able
to be effective in focusing the groups on
the issue of apartheid, thus empowering themselves.35 This sounds more like
politics than human rights. Aside from a
discussion of the implicit human rights
violation represented by apartheid itself,
the chapter makes only rare mention
of human rights themselves. Two brief
mentions include the observation that
“the language of human rights appears to
have played little role in how the Young
Liberals framed their opposition to apartheid,”36 while another, several pages on,
states that “the language of human rights
was sometimes used” in anti-apartheid
fliers.37 This is hardly an overwhelming
case for a ground-shifting explosion of
human rights concerns about apartheid
in Britain in the 1970s.
Several chapters in this volume,
however, fit snugly within the MoynEckel paradigm of a new human rights
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
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regime, distinctive to the decade of the
1970s. One of the chapters that best fit
this model was that by Daniel Sargent,
on what he calls the US “[r]ediscovery”
of human rights in the decade of the
1970s.38 Sargent, who clearly subscribes
to the Moynian project,39 uses the clever
metaphor of the oasis. “Like oases,” he
says, “human rights breakthroughs are
rare.”40 An oasis metaphor, he goes on
to say, works well because it “acknowledges both the specificity in place and
time of particular human rights eruptions
and their connectedness to deeper wells
of action and thought.”41 For him, the
“groundwater” of human rights actions
is made of two elements, one that is humanitarian, and thus ethical and moral,
while the other is that “the idea of natural
rights, is political and philosophical.”42
For Sargent, several key activities of
the 1970s within the United States had
global reach: President Jimmy Carter
“would proclaim human rights to be ‘the
soul of our foreign policy.’”43 Congress
passed laws that conditioned foreign
assistance on compliance with human
rights. The State Department began to
issue reports on human rights conditions in foreign countries. “Law schools
began to teach human rights,” and “the
American Bar Association . . . endorsed
the Genocide Convention.”44 Before
Carter’s presidency, President Richard
Nixon used détente as a political lever to

Id. at 206–07, 208 (Figure 12.1).
Id. at 207, 209, 223.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 220.
Daniel Sargent, Oasis in the Desert? America’s Human Rights Rediscovery, in The Breakthrough, supra note 1, at 125.
Id. at 126 (footnote omitted) (“Nobody states this revisionist hypothesis better than
Samuel Moyn, who locates the emergence of a recognizable human rights doctrine in
the 1970s.”).
Id. at 125.
Id. at 126.
Id.
Id. at 129.
Id.
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expose human rights shortcomings during
his travels to Moscow and Beijing in the
early years of the decade.45 Even Henry
Kissinger said in 1976 that human rights
had become “one of the most compelling issues of our time.”46 These and other
examples make a strong case for viewing
the 1970s as a distinctive human rights
oasis in US history. Curiously, that chapter
reads well together with the one that follows it, on human rights policy within the
US Republican Party in the late 1970s, by
Bon Tempo.47 I was not prepared to buy
into the notion of Republican embrace
of human rights on the eve of the Reagan
era, but I could accept Bon Tempo’s more
limited thesis that the party “grappled
with human rights” during the 1976
Republican National Convention and
its aftermath, when conservative Ronald
Reagan began to articulate his own views
on human rights. That “grappling” may
well have been the result of the ascendency of human rights as a central tenet
of Carter’s foreign policy, but the chapter
was persuasive.
Two other contributions to this volume, both on Latin America in the 1970s,
also seemed to fit the Moynian project
well. Both focus on the turbulent times
of dictatorship and oppression during that
decade (although not necessarily begun
then) in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina.48
In reading these chapters, particularly
after those on the invocation of human
rights as shield by Soviet dissidents and
socialist women, one is struck by their
use in this context as sword. The distinction is one that might be called defense
45.
46.
47.
48.

49.
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of human rights versus defense from
human rights. The dissidents sought the
protection of human rights, while the
dictatorial regimes in the Southern Cone
sought to shield themselves from human
rights criticism, invoking the well-worn
shibboleth of protecting the population
from “terrorist” or “Communist” threats.
Coups occurred in Brazil in 1964, in
Chile in 1973, and in Argentina in 1976,
and all were followed by periods of brutal
repression of weakly organized insurgent
movements, primarily through coordinated regimes of torture and the “disappearing” of political opponents by police
and militaries, a phenomenon invented
in that era. The left’s response to these
actions was not passive; their response
to the violence directed against them
invoked the imagery of Fidel Castro and
Che Guevara, one of armed struggle. “To
these activists . . . [h]uman rights were nowhere on their moral radar,” notes Patrick
Kelly in his chapter.49 Human rights, he
continues, became an instrumental tool
of the revolution, with several approaches
to their invocation based on practical
expediency. Activists, both domestically and internationally, particularly
within the large and ever-growing exiled
populations, built coalitions among the
church and NGO communities and drew
the attention (albeit reluctant at first) of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations, the US
Congress, the Carter administration, and
ad hoc international support coalitions
such as the International Commission of
Enquiry into the Crimes of the Military

Id. at 133–37.
Id. at 129.
Bon Tempo, supra note 21, at 146.
Patrick William Kelly, “Magic Words”: The Advent of Transnational Human Rights Activism in Latin America’s Southern Cone in the Long 1970s, in The Breakthrough, supra
note 1, at 88; Lynsay Skiba, Shifting Sites of Argentine Advocacy and the Shape of 1970s
Human Rights Debates, in The Breakthrough, supra note 1, at 107.
Kelly, supra note 48, at 98.
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Junta in Chile. At bottom, Kelly concludes, the idea of human rights “was
fundamentally a minimalist solution to
political cataclysm,”50 but “the lexicon
of human rights gradually snowballed,”
culminating in the stirring language of
the report of the Chilean Commission
on Truth and Reconciliation in 1994:
“[Human] rights are those than (sic) no
power . . . can trample.”51 Lynsay Skiba
focuses her chapter on two pivotal events
in the decade. One was the 1976 hearings on the human rights situation in
Argentina, held by the House Subcommittee on International Organizations
and Movements, chaired by Minnesota
Representative Donald Fraser, which held
more than 150 hearings on global human
rights issues between 1973 and 1978.52
The second was the September 1979
visit by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights to Argentina.53 These
incidents provided an opportunity for human rights to transform the debate, in her
view, and her meticulous documentation
supports that conclusion.
Despite this powerful array of stories,
however, I was left with one central question regarding time-framing and history:
what if a similar lens were focused on any
decade, particularly after the watershed
events of the post-war period in which the
UN and Universal Declaration of Human
Rights came into being in the late 1940s?
What about the 1950s or 1960s? What
about the 1980s (if they are not included
in the long 1970s) or 1990s? If historians
focused their laser analysis on those
decades, could similar pivotal events be
found? And does the significance of the
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
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events in the given time frame depend
on the perspective of the historian, who
can give or take value from any particular
historical event? At least some insight into
this issue is provided by the discussion
of Moyn’s work by Anghie, mentioned
above. In his critique of the Moynian
project, Anghie invokes concepts from
law, but not mainstream international
law. Instead, he invokes a vision of human rights as experienced by those from
the Third World, where, in historical
perspective, the most important human
rights, after self-determination, were racial equality and development.54 Moyn
responds to Anghie at length, and his
concessionary response bears extended
quotation here:
Anghie is persuasive in his commentary, for
example, that I slight in the main narrative
of my book what are some of the crucial
developments in the international lawyer’s
self-understanding (the Genocide Convention [which entered into force in 1951], the
post-World War II refugee regime [and its
principal treaty, adopted in 1951], or the
United Nations human rights covenants [of
1966, and especially the Race Convention
of 1969], for example, or UN activism
around South Africa [from the 1950s on],
of which I nevertheless do make recurrent
mention). More broadly, my insistence
on the centrality of self-determination
to anticolonialism risks neglecting that
without the work of the new states in the
early Cold War on human rights—at the
very least in the formulation and passage
of those covenants—nothing else would
have followed.55

Although Professor Moyn, of course,
then defends his views, seeking to recover

Id. at 105.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 111–17.
Id. at 119–23.
See generally, Anghie, supra note 20.
Moyn, The Continuing Perplexities of Human Rights, supra note 8, at 108. Bracketed
material is my own, to clarify context and dates.
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from the Anghie critique, his concessions
here are significant and point back to his
own contention that the Moynian project
is only a hypothesis.
There are two more chapters that may
not fit the Moynian project’s 1970s time
frame well, although it appears that it is
the authors themselves who conclude
that to be the case. In the chapter on the
1975 World Congress on Women in East
Berlin, Celia Donert concludes that “the
1990s rather than the 1970s appear to
be the heyday of human rights mobilizations for women’s advocacy groups and
NGOs.”56 She reaches this conclusion,
however, after a moving chapter on
what she calls “the neglected role of the
Soviet bloc in promoting gender equality
as a human right during the 1970s.” This
occurred, she asserts, at a “forgotten episode: the East Berlin World Conference of
Women in International Women’s Year,”
which was held in 1975, smack in the
middle of the allegedly pivotal decade.57
Another chapter that seems to equivocate
about the 1970s as pivotal years is the
chapter on Soviet dissidents, by Benjamin
Nathans.58 Nathans adopts his own version of the “long 1970s” historical trick,
calling the period from 1968 to 1979
“the Soviet seventies.”59 Nathans seems to
conclude that the collapse of the socialist
ideal occurred not in the moment of “the
crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968 (as
important as that was) but Khrushchev’s
‘unmasking’ of Stalin’s charisma-based
cult of personality in 1956. Well before
the 1970s, then, Soviet dissidents had
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
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begun to shed their faith in the socialist
utopia.”60 Again, however, this conclusion
on socialism as a political system follows
a trenchant analysis situating the actions
of a group of Soviet dissidents—Yuri Orlov, Elena Bonner, Anatoly Shcharansky,
and Petro Grigorenko—within the ambit
of the Helsinki Watch Groups that sprang
up in Moscow and elsewhere, firmly
within the 1970s framework. That the
dissidents changed their name in 1969
to the Initiative Group for the Defense
of Human Rights in the USSR is strong
testimony to a new narrative power of
human rights language.61
The chapter on the East Berlin Women’s Conference follows an analytical
line that flows through the preceding
chapters on socialist systems, one that
distinguishes between individual versus
collective human rights conceptions in
socialist law. The Soviet dissidents, for
example, are said to invoke human rights
on their behalf while never “criticizing either the theory or practice of the
USSR’s elaborate system of socialist
rights guaranteed by the state—from free
child care, medical care, and education
(up through the postsecondary level) to
subsidized housing and vacations.”62 In
his chapter on human rights in East Germany in the 1970s, Ned Richardson-Little
suggests that the ruling Socialist Unity
Party (known by its German acronym as
the SED) invoked an alternative vision of
human rights:

Celia Donert, Whose Utopia? Gender, Ideology, and Human Rights at the 1975 World
Congress of Women in East Berlin, in The Breakthrough, supra note 1, at 68, 86.
Id. at 68.
Benjamin Nathans, The Disenchantment of Socialism: Soviet Dissidents, Human Rights,
and the New Global Morality, in The Breakthrough, supra note 1, at 33.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 38, 39.
Id. at 45.
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Human rights in a socialist society moved
beyond the destructive egotistical right to
act out of pure self-interest promoted by
legal rights in a liberal democracy. Socialist human rights were instead the natural
outcome of the new socialist economy and
social order that the SED had created in
East Germany. This did not mean that East
Germans had the right to vote or organize
as they pleased but that their human rights
would be inherently fulfilled by their full
participation in the socialist economic and
social system.63

This shift from an individual to a
collective view of human rights in the
socialist regimes was one of the signal
contributions of this volume, and it provocatively challenges the reader to adopt
a view of human rights consistent with
his or her own experience and study. The
next section of this review will examine
that area more closely.

iv.	Human Rights as
Subject: Practical and
Theoretical Definitions
Early in The Last Utopia, Moyn defines
“contemporary human rights as a set of
global political norms providing the creed
of a transnational social movement.”64 In
a recent review essay mentioned above,
Alston asserts that the two essential elements of this definition—global reach
and being championed by a transnational
movement—are both artificial and hollow.65 Without reiterating his salient
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
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criticisms of the Moynian project, Alston
asserts that any definition of the human
rights enterprise must acknowledge its
“[i]ntrinsic [p]olycentricity.”66 In support
of that thesis, he argues that human rights
conceptually “might be thought of” alternatively as an idea, an elaborated discourse, a social movement, a practice, a
legal regime, or a system, and that “each
of these categories would constitute a
plausible focus for analysis.”67 I tend
to agree with Alston on this count and
reiterate his views here for two reasons.
First, Eckel adopts exactly the Alston
formulation, in seeming contradiction
to the Moynian project; and second, a
polycentric view reflects the myriad ways
in which the human rights are defined in
The Breakthrough.
In his masterful concluding chapter,
Eckel explains the 1970s human rights
revolution “not . . . as a uniform shift.
Rather, it evolved in a polycentric and
fitful process, or perhaps . . . in a set of
processes mutually reinforcing each other
but nevertheless distinct in themselves.”68
He describes various extraneous factors
that contribute to an explanatory framework for examination of human rights.
They include decolonization, détente,
mass media, mass mobilization and the
presence of suffering, and transformation of the political left and churches.69
In sum, human rights appeared as “a
profoundly moral yet multifunctional way
of revitalizing politics, both as an ideal
and as a practice.”70 While he acknowledges the “polycentricity” hypothesis in

Ned Richardson-Little, Dictatorship and Dissent: Human Rights in East Germany in the
1970s, in The Breakthrough, supra note 1, at 49, 54–55.
Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History 11 (2010).
Alston, supra note 10, at 2073.
Id. at 2077–79.
Id. at 2078.
Eckel, supra note 4, at 241.
Id. at 242–52.
Id. at 252.
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his opening chapter, I am not sure Moyn
buys it. He suggests this “does not mean
that there is any obvious general perspective from which the explosion of human
rights in the 1970s comes into view.”71
He leaves it to readers to decide which
story to accept, but it seems clear that his
own lean is towards a particular vision
of human rights.
If the Moynian project requires a
particular definition of human rights for
its realization, this book does little to
stabilize definitions. Eckel’s polycentrism
seems the more apt term. In addition to
the socialist definition offered above, The
Breakthrough offers at least four other
definitions of human rights, some inconsistent with others. The socialist definition
seems to have carried the day at the 1968
UN Conference on Human Rights, held in
Iran and hosted by the Shah himself. One
observer of that conference notes that
“concentrated state power was lauded
as the path to freedom as opposed to a
serious threat to it.” Anti-imperialism and
self-determination held sway.72 A second
definition swings in the opposite direction, lauding the “depoliticized” nature of
human rights, a “language that seemingly
hid its politics.”73 The strong commitment
to armed struggle and socialist principles,
certainly part of the ethos of the decade in
Latin America, led to approaches that saw
human rights as “a savvy propagandistic
tool” that extended the socialist cause, or
“a strategic device that did not foreclose
a revolutionary future,” or even a “global
shift in the ‘ideological matrix’ of the left”
during that decade.74
A third definition arises from the
other end of the Cold War spectrum.
In the West, human rights were seen as
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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“liberal and individualistic. Proponents
stood for liberty, limited government,
and the free movement of ideas and
people. Defenders of human rights in the
West paid little attention to collectivist
concepts of rights, such as the right to
national self-determination.”75 And even
within the West, liberals and conservatives clashed. A fourth view of human
rights, from conservative Republicans,
held that “human rights were most clearly
expressed and honored when individuals
eschewed reliance on government and
its programs in favor of exercising their
‘responsibilities as free citizens.’”76 These
myriad variations on the meaning of human rights in theory and action suggest
the heart of the problem for any historian
who seeks, as Moyn and his apostles do,
to locate human rights in any particular
time frame; the political terrain of any
decade may be too globally diverse to
give human rights a single meaning in
time and place.
Before leaving this issue of definitions,
it seems to me that there are two issues
that require mention. Both have to do
with how governments responded to the
rise in human rights rhetoric during the
decade of the 1970s. One is very overt,
the other covert. As to the first, I was
struck by the repeated mention, in several
chapters, of the use by governments or
insurgencies of media consultants to convey their messages—professional public
relations firms, almost always based in
the United States. We see this first in the
Biafra revolution, where rebels deftly portrayed the issue of starving Biafran babies
through a media campaign that captured
the world’s attention.77 Almost unnoticed
is a mention that the rebels “tried to open

Moyn, The Return of the Prodigal, supra note 2, at 13.
Richardson-Little, supra note 63, at 56 (quoting Roland Burke).
Kelly, supra note 48, at 90.
Id. at 98–99.
Sargent, supra note 38, at 137.
Bon Tempo, supra note 21, at 157–58.
Heerten, supra note 6, at 19–20.
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a new front” by enlisting “the services of
international public relations agencies
to coordinate their campaign.”78 Again,
when the Argentine government began
to receive harsh criticism for its failure to
protect fundamental human rights, “[t]he
junta hired a U.S. public relations firm to
manage its international reputation, and
it produced propaganda for dissemination in the Argentine and international
press.”79 I am amused by the parity given
to “public relations” and “propaganda.”
Finally, in the case of Indonesia, the government “hired a New York public relations firm, Hill and Knowlton, to trumpet
positive news” about the successes of
the regime in power.80 This routine turn
to media control and pro-government
spin speaks volumes about the rhetorical
power of human rights, both as concept
and moral force.
Finally, there is the issue of covert
interference from abroad, either in support of or against a particular regime in
power. Covert operations supported by
the CIA (and the Soviet KGB) were in
full force throughout the decade of the
1970s, continuing the work they had
begun so successfully in the 1950s with
the orchestration of the overthrow of
the elected governments of Iran in 1953

78.
79.
80.
81.

82.
83.
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and Guatemala in 1954.81 Declassified
documents show the role of clandestine
operations in many of the areas covered
by this book, including the Southern
Cone of South America. Operation
Condor, perhaps the most iconic of the
covert operations, and supported covertly
by the United States, involved the sharing of intelligence information across
borders, beginning officially in 1975 and
continuing throughout the Dirty Wars
years in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina.82
The information was used to hunt, arrest,
and clandestinely transfer accused “subversives” across borders, where they were
interrogated, tortured, and often killed by
state authorities. While these operations
do not bear directly on human rights, they
provide damning evidence of unclean
hands on the part of those who sought to
defend their human rights record during
the relevant period.
There is only one oblique mention
of covert operations in this volume. The
chapter on Indonesia is authored by
Brad Simpson, a historian with extensive
knowledge of US support for clandestine
operations in that country.83 Professor
Simpson states, early in his chapter, that a
“search of nearly nine thousand pages of
declassified U.S. State Department docu-

Id. at 18.
Skiba, supra note 48, at 121.
Brad Simpson, “Human Rights are Like Coca-Cola”: Contested Human Rights Discourses
in Suharto’s Indonesia, 1968–1980, in The Breakthrough, supra note 1, at 186, 199.
See, e.g., Steven Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle
East Terror (2008) (scrupulously documenting the role of the CIA in the overthrow of
Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, to be replaced by the brutal regime of Reza
Shah); Stephen Schlesinger et al., Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala,
Revised and Expanded (2005) (scrupulously documenting the role of CIA in the overthrow
of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, to be replaced by a brutal military dictatorship).
See, e.g., John Dinges, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and his Allies Brought Terrorism to
Three Continents (2005).
The short bio on Professor Simpson notes his authorship of Economists with Guns:
Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesia Relations: 1960–1968 (2010). He is
director of the Indonesia/East Timor Documentation Project of the National Security
Archive, which serves as a research institute on US government secrecy and clandestine
operations. See The Indonesia/East Timor Documentation Project, The National Security
Archive, The George Washington University (28 Jan. 2008), http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
indonesia/index.html, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/arc_staff.html.
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ments concerning the 1965–1966 killings
[of alleged communists], for example,
yields not a single reference to human
rights.”84 This seems to miss the point in
an almost breathtaking way. First is the
obvious point I have made before: these
events take place in the 1960s, not the
1970s. More importantly, though, here
is a historian with knowledge of the US
role in human rights abuses committed
during the regime of Indonesian President
Suharto (1965 to 1998) who writes as
though Indonesia’s political actions, and
those who opposed them, were taken
through their own independent agency
during the relevant time period. Should
we be surprised that the clandestine
operations of the US government do not
ever make reference to human rights? I
should think not. But can a true and accurate history of Indonesia and human
rights during the 1970s be told without
fully exploring the role of those agencies
in the domestic politics of that country?
Again, I do not think so.

v.	Human Rights and
the Historiographic
Explosion
Professor Moyn notes in his introduction
that “[a] mere decade ago, no historians
were working on human rights in any
time period.”85 We might ask, as he does,
why this is so. The answer seems obvious:
human rights have come to play a key
role in world politics and international
affairs and appear in headlines every
day in every medium. This final section

84.
85.
86.
87.
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notes the historiographic phenomenon
and situates this work in the broader arc
of historical research. The Breakthrough
is part of the explosion of interest in human rights histories. I recall that in 1990,
when I first opened a law school clinical
program focused on international human
rights law, it was impossible to find a
comprehensive history of human rights.
Eight years later, in 1998, Paul Gordon
Lauren published his lovely and comprehensive volume, also a part of the Penn
Studies in Human Rights Series, called
The Evolution of International Human
Rights: Visions Seen (1998), which has
since been republished deservedly in new
editions. I read it eagerly, and assigned
some parts of it to my students. Quite
soon, however, I found that I couldn’t
keep up with the growing blizzard of
histories. Kenneth Cmiel, in one of the
earliest historiographies of human rights,
included no comprehensive bibliography
at the close of his 2004 article, and called
the field “refreshingly inchoate.”86 A
growing bibliographical index followed
a 2006 historiography written from the
perspective of anthropology and human
rights.87 In it, the author documents what
appears to be a rather stunning statement:
in 1947, on the eve of the adoption by
the UN of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the American Anthropological Association adopted a “Statement
on Human Rights” that it submitted to
the UN Commission on Human Rights in
anticipation of the event. The statement,
says the author, “rejected the validity of
a universal declaration of human rights
on both empirical and ethical grounds.”
The Board of the Association “opposed

Simpson, supra note 80, at 190.
Moyn, The Return of the Prodigal, supra note 2, at 13.
Kenneth Cmiel, The Recent History of Human Rights, 109 Am. Hist. Rev. 117, 119 (2004).
Mark Goodale, Toward a Critical Anthropology of Human Rights, 47 Current Anthropology 485 (2006).
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a universal declaration of human rights
because of its imperialistic irony.”88 Anthropology has come a long way from
that early and embarrassing entry into
the field of human rights.
Reza Afshari used the Lauren text,
The Evolution of Human Rights, as the
occasion for his authorship of another
historiographic essay on human rights in
2007, published in this journal.89 Afshari
draws on his own knowledge of Islamic
history and Third World politics to challenge, in a loving and supportive way, the
premises set out in Lauren’s work, and his
perspective thickens our understanding
of the richness of the tapestry of human
rights. In a post-war period normally
dominated by discussions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Afshari
instead points to the importance of the
gatherings of the group that became the
Non-Aligned Movement, from the first
in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, hosted
by the nationalist leader Sukarno, to the
1979 meeting in Havana, where the
proposed New International Economic
Order took precedence over more general
discussion of human rights, with stress
on “the rights to development and to
equal opportunity to obtain it.”90 Afshari’s
critique of Lauren sounds quite similar to
that by Anghie of Moyn, discussed above.
Two more recent historiographies
deserve mention here. First, in its Fall/
Winter issue of 2013, the interdisciplinary periodical Qui Parle published an
insightful and incisive series of articles

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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in what it called a “Special Issue: Human Rights between Past and Future,”
many pieces from which are cited in this
review. They include the exchanges between Professors Moyn and Anghie at the
2011 meeting of the American Political
Science Association and begin to show
the ascendency of Moyn as a historical
force with which to be reckoned.
Finally, I will close where I began.
In 2012, Professor Moyn published his
own historiography of human rights.91
It is grand, indeed, and focuses on
three dimensions of human rights: their
substance, or content; their scale, or
geographical scope; and their salience,
effectively their impact in the world. His
bibliography covers more than a hundred
titles. All but a very few are histories done
by non-lawyers. As Professor Alston notes
in his critique of Moyn’s work, he has
ignored or neglected at least nine categories of actors, virtually all of whom are
lawyers or players in major international
movements such as those for minority
rights, labor rights, women’s rights, or
children’s rights.92 The point remains,
however: The Moynian project must be
engaged, as I hope it has been here.
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i.

Introduction

More than sixty-five years have passed
since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed the right of all
humans “to a standard of living adequate
for the health and well-being of himself
and his family.”1 In the years since, while
millions of preventable deaths occur
each year, the right to health has been
enshrined in numerous international
		 1.
		2.
		3.
		4.
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and regional human rights treaties, as
well as in the constitutions of over 115
countries. Human rights and health are
now inextricably linked as normative and
legal matters.
Human rights scholars and practitioners, in turn, have endeavored to define
and effect the right to health, at times
making remarkable progress, like when
activists successfully challenged the
South African Ministry of Health for not
making drugs to prevent mother-to-child
transmission of HIV widely available to
the population in Minister of Health and
others v. Treatment Action Campaign and
others.2 At other times, advocates have
encountered frustration, stagnation, and
even retrogression, like when Haiti’s
citizens recently confronted a devastating cholera outbreak that the government
and international community could not
swiftly address.3 Notably, the right to
health’s boldest expressions have often
appeared in the world’s poorest and
most unequal settings, while wealthier
countries have frequently rejected positive framings of the state’s duties to its
own citizens.
Advancing the Human Right to Health
provides an insightful retrospective on the
right to health advocacy and a foreshadowing of what is to come.4 With authors
who offer a broad view of conflicts that
exist in international health discourse,
such as the tensions that persist between
public health and human rights, the
book provides a refreshing opportunity
to more closely analyze and potentially

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217A (1948).
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